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Labour militancy and private contracting: 
public hospital ancillary services 
John Stubbs* 
This paper attempts to show that regional variations in the strength of labour 
force militancy can be an important factor in mediating the regional 
development of privatization. By taking the private contracting of New Zealand 
public hospital ancillary services as a specific case study, it is seen that, in 
some cases, labour militancy can lead to the elimination of private contracting. 
While ackno'w/edging the need for further research on this issue, some 
tentative conclusions a.re drawn on the relevance of labour militancy to the 
pri'vatization of public service provision in other social contexts. 
1. Introduction 
Since the election of the Labour Government in 1984, the New Zealand economy has 
undergone extensive economic restructuring. 'This has largely consisted of a 
comprehensive process of market deregulation and privatization of state sector industry. 
Subsumed under the tern• privatization has been the corporatization of ·many government 
departments., the selling of State assets, and the contracting out of some public services 
to the private sector (private contracting). Certain government provided services, 
typically those deemed to provide an essential social function, such as hospital care, are 
increasingly being contracted out to private sector operators. By contracting out a 
service, the government still remains the fonder while the private sector becomes the 
provider of the service itself. 
In times of growing government fiscal constraints, privatization policies appear 
attractive to policy makers as a means to r~educe public expenditure. Whatever the 
validity or otherwise of this argument, privatization has often been accompanied by 
substantial job loss, reduced employment conditions and a deterioration in the levels of 
service provision. Not surprisingly, therefore., there has been much opposition, from 
service user groups and trade unions (PSA, 1989). 
Regardless of the way privatization has been implemented, considerable variation 
exists in the extent to which it has occurred both between, and within, individual nation-
states. Similarly, privatization has proceeded very unevenly between certain industries or 
sectors within industries. These observations raise the immediate question of why, and 
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how, this uneven process occurs. This 
militancy may have upon the contracting oat fJf 
between different hospital boards. CoDSideraliea 
industtially militant labour force can inhibit dle 
The first section of the paper details the 
different hospital boards, and briefly describes die 
The second pan examines the rationale for Jabour 
particular case of hospital aacillary services. 
adopted by the relevant trade union to combat the po. 
foiins a substantive pan of the paper, atteatioa 011 
demonsttate the way in which labour force militancy in the workplace can 
development of privatization. The concluding section hiiJirligbtl some of die (K 
the bade union campaign of opposition with regard to the future developmea of 
privatization of the public sectm' economy. 
2. Regional variations in tbe development of privatization 
Regional variations in the extent of conttacting out pubic 
(domestic cleaning, orderly (portering) and dietary (caterial) ~lie shown i8 
figure 1. The variations are given in respect of private conncting since 1975 in an (1R) 
existing 29 hospital boards. I 
There are basically 3 actors of interest in respect of explaining the 
pattern that has developed. Without implying any order of significance, the first the 
elected members of the hospital boards who represent local and regional community 
interests. These elected officials have the final decision on whether or not to ptivatize an 
ancillary service. Second, is the hospital management which is responsible for the 
administration of service provision. The managers are required to gain the approval of 
their respective hospital board members before making any major policy changes such as 
private contracting. The board members, in their turn, rely critically upon infOJJilatlOD 
supplied by hospital managers in making policy decisions. The third is the woftforce 
employed to provide the services. In this case there is no direct input into pOlicy 
foiination. However, there is an indirect input, in the form of iadusl'ial unrest, which 
can arise if policies adopted are detrimental to workers' employment conditions. 
A feature that is immediately apparent from the maps in figure 1 is the consideQJble 
variation in the regional pattern of contracting out ovez time. A detailed account of this 
is given elsewhere (Stubbs, 1990) but it is useful to detail some of the more ...... 
features. Private contracting for hospital ancillary services fii'St developed after World 
War II in response to a severe labour shortage in the economy. By conttacting out, 
hospital boards were spared the difficult administrative problems of staff recrui•ntent and 
supervision. The initial success of conttact service provi$ion saw the process expand 
through the 1950s and 1960s. 
For most of the 1970s, there was a period of relative stagnation in the process bat, at 
the end of the decade, a much more complex pattern of privatization to develap. 
Largely in response to the start of a series of centtal government on hospital 
board expenditure, some boards which had hitherto been providing their own sa vices <--1· 
Auckland and Hawke's Bay), found that savings could be made by out their 
ancillary services. Contractors claimed to be able to run · much more 
1 By mid 1989, all hospital boards had been replaced by 14 area health boardL Te ]ft'Vide 
comparison with earlier yeus, the original boundaries of the pnwiaus 29 
have been maintained. Where in figure 1 a hospital board is shown u 
service this does not necessarily mean that all hospitals within 
contractors. 
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effectively, principally by using fewer staff, than the boards could. By contrast, other 
boards such as Wanganui and Palmerston North, which had been engaging contractors 
since the early 1950s, found that savings could be made through terminating the 
contracts. The savings, they argued, largely arose from no longer paying the contractor's 
profit margin and overhead costs. 
It is particularly instructive to examine the maps in figure 1 for 1985 and 1990. 
These show that there has been no further development of private contracting since the 
mid 1980s. To the extent that there have been changes in the geographical pattern over 
the last 5 years it has been towards a decrease in the process, as exemplified in the cases 
of Auckland and Northland. In view of the generally increasing financial constraints on 
hospital and area health boards, and moves to privatize much of the rest of the public 
sector economy since 1985, this observation is worthy of further consideration. Why has 
the process stagnated from the mid 1980s and even slightly reversed? 
One significant development in the 1980s has been the growth of labour force 
militancy towards private contracting. The issue to address then is the extent of any 
causal relation between the rise of militancy and the stagnation of the privatization 
process. First, there is a need to establish why there has been opposition to private 
contracting and secondly how it has manifested itself in practice. 
3. The rationale for labour force opposition to private 
contracting in public hospitals 
Labour force opposition to private contracting is based on 2 main premises: the lack 
of public accountability of private contractors and the deterioration in working conditions 
of the labour force. Difficulties with public accountability have been experienced with all 
sizes of contracting companies. Small companies are sometimes of doubtful financial 
viability, easily go bankrupt and leave behind unpaid wages and a public authority with 
no means of service provision. A trade union article written in 1981 for hospital (and 
hotel) workers argued that: 
In this situation (of bankruptcy), the union which has almost certainly been 
fully involved for some time trying to see that staff receive the correct Award 
wages has to get in and pick up the pieces for members who have been left with 
wages and holiday pay owing from the bankrupt contractor (HOSP, January-
February, 19 81 , p .1 ) . 
Large multinational companies on the other hand, are not liable to bankruptcy but, 
through having such large resources at their disposal, it is very hard for both trade unions 
and public authorities to control what they do. There is often a need for rigorous quality 
control by hospital boards to maintain standards, and constant surveillance by trade 
unions to ensure that agreed upon employment conditions are adhered to. 
Regardless of size of company, trade unions see contractors' primary motive as being 
to make a (private) profit rather than provide a (public) service. To the extent that public 
service cut backs occur, this effectively represents a cut in the social wage of all workers. 
The issue of the individual wage is equally, if not more, contentious as this relates 
directly to employment conditions. 
Superficially, ancillary workers' employment conditions are the same whether the 
workforce is employed by the hospital authority or a private contractor. The national 
award document provides for the same wage rate, holiday pay, sick leave and overtime 
payments, whether workers are employed by a hospital board or a private contractor and 
• 
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regardless of geographical region.2 The main points of contention for the workforce 
primarily relate to the number of workers employed by contractors, the security of 
employment from ru:bitrary dismissal, the flexibility of workers' hours and the work 
intensity required. Weekend and night work attracts enhanced pay rates, but with private 
contractors the amount of hours worked at these times is often substantially reduced. 
Fonner full time jobs become part time ones. The take home pay is often much lower 
with private contracting even though the nominal pay rate remains the same as when 
employed by the hospital board. In a low paid industry (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989) 
this wage loss would be expected to generate much opposition to contract service 
• • prOVISIOn. 
A further contentious issue is the extent of staff reductions in the ancillary sector. 
Table 1 gives data on changes to housekeeping (domestic and orderly) and dietary staff 
numbers for the period 1980 to 1988 for those hospital boards from whom a 
comprehensive set of data could be obtained. Where data has been available since 1975 
this has shown that, in all but a very few cases, numbers increased slightly to around 
1980 and then reduced significantly thereafter. It cannot therefore be said that the 
reductions since 1980 merely continued a pre-existing trend. 
Notwithstanding the sparsity of data, jobs have certainly been lost in the hospital 
ancillary sector particularly in the housekeeping services. The relationship between staff 
reductions and privatization however is not readily shown. While it is the case that some 
boards engaging contractors have shown significant staff reductions as, for example, in 
the housekeeping services in South Otago, Thames and Vinc·ent, it is also apparent that 
services provided by boards themselves have also had large staff cuts. The board-provided 
dietary services in Otago, Nelson and Wanganui .are prime examples of this latter 
situation. 
A further noteworthy teature is that, in the case of housekeeping services, it has not 
been possible to obtain disaggregated data showing the number of cleaning and orderly 
staff separately. Many boards, such as Canterbury., Otago and Taranaki, contract out their 
cleaning but not their orderly services. It has not then been possible to ascertain from the 
data whether housekeeping staff reductions are due to changes in either cleaning (contract) 
or orderly (board) staff or both. N~evertheless, the view is strongly held by the trade 
unions, .and indeed many hospital boards and contractors as well, that contract service 
provision results in greater staff cuts than does hospital board provision. 
A further noteworthy point is that ancillary services, especially cleaning and orderly 
work, are highly labour intensive and, unlike many other industries outside the health 
sector, it has not been possible to reduce the workforce significantly by introducing new 
technology. This is not to say that modem machinery and cleaning agents have not 
played som·e part in reducing staff but rather, in spite of these advances, productivity 
increases have had to come more through intensifying the physical nature of the work 
process - that is through work speed-ups. It is therefore hardly surprising that substantial 
workforce resistance has been encountered. In the next section some of the consequences 
of, and resistance to, the pressure applied by contractors to reduce staff are examined. 
2 This condition does not extend to workers in private hospitals who, while being in the 
same trade union, are covered by a different award in which the basic pay rate is lower than 
in the public hospitals. Workers in rest homes are on yet another award with still lower 
rates of pay. In June 1989, the following basic weekly (40 hours) pay rates obtained for, 
domestics (cleaners), kitchen hands, and orderlies: 
Public hospitals $3 34.44 
Private hospitals $3 26.02 
Rest homes $308.60 
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Table 1: Percentage changes to 
boards 1980-88 
Hospital Board 
Auckland 
Canterbmy 
Otago 
Waikato 
Wellington 
Cook 
Hawke's Bay 
Nelson 
Northland 
Palmerston North 
S. Canterbury 
Southland 
Taranaki 
Tauranga 
Wanganui 
West Coast 
Ash burton 
Bay of Plenty 
C. Hawke's Bay 
Dannevirke 
Maniototo 
Marlborough 
South Otago 
Taumarunui 
Thames 
Vincent 
Waiapu 
w~ 
Waitaki 
-
-38.2 
J 
~ 
- 15.5 
-29.1 
- 9.! 
___, 
-13A 
-1S 
h 
-21.5 
- 5.1 
-22.8 
- 10.3 
-39.3 
-26.0 
-23.4 
- 7.7 
0 
b 
-53.6 
b 
-32.0 
-40.0 
-26.3 
- 3.5 
-42.9 
Source: Hospital/area health boards and hospitaliii8Jl8pment dala 
Notes: a Housekeeping comprises an aggmaate of domesdc ap4 
• 
servtces. 
b Insufficient data. 
4. Trade union policy and contracting 01lt 
A campaign of industrial action against 
but this policy must also be seen as part of a broader 
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in trade union affairs and the maintenance of the public hospital system. In the words of 
a prominent official of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union: 
The whole drive was to bring the union back to the members. If they felt an 
action by an employer was unjust, they had to decide: does it go to court again 
or should they take direct industrial action. We advocated a direct response to 
injustice rather than waiting for the legal system to take effect. 
w .e also improved communications with members. We started a union 
newspaper, published a training manual, hired an education officer, elected more 
delegates and got all of them more involved with the decision making process 
(Metro, September 1989, p.116). 
In order to see whether there was a regional variation in the effectiveness of this 
campaign, an attempt was .made to fmd out which hospital board districts have had the 
most industrially militant ancillary workforces and relate this ·militancy to the regionally 
uneven development of private contracting. Work stoppages, whether complete (i.·e. 
strik~es) or partial (i.e. work bans on selected duties) may arguably be the most obvious 
surrogate of labour militancy or class conflict. Unfortunately, officially published 
statistics on this measme afe not sufficiently disaggregated to include public hospitals. 
To gain data on this subject, a survey was conducted of the industrial action taken by 
ancillary workers across the entir~e country. Initially it was hoped to gather data felating 
to the number of working days lost per annum per ~employee, to measure quantitatively 
the levels of industrial militancy in each hospital board district. Unfortunately, a sparsity 
of trade union records prevented such a comprehensive set of data being collated. It was 
however still possible to detetanine where and when the most prolonged industrial action 
took place. It can be seen from table 2 that major strike action lasting more than a week 
has been confmed exclusively to the Northland, Auckland and Wellington Hospital Boards 
and all occurred in the 1980s. 'This, however, is not to deny the existence of widespread 
industrial action throughout the decade in other boards. Moreover, as table 2 shows, the 
industrial action has not just been over private contracting, but also over matters like the 
breakdown of national wage negotiations. 
In respect of industrial action specifically related to private contracting, the important 
point, as will be seen presently, is that only in Auckland and Northland has it been 
sustained over a long period of time. In order to gain a perspective on the way in which 
labour force militancy impacted upon the geographical development of private contracting 
in the ancillary sector a comparative study was made of 4 hospital boards that adopted 
opposing policies for ancillary service provision. 
5. Contracting out an~d labour militancy: case studies 
It is instructive to compare the fonn of ancillary service provision in Northland .and 
Auckland with the Southland and Otago boards. Auckland and Otago contracted out their 
domestic cleaning services in 1981 and 1982 respectively. Southland and Northland 
contracted out their dietary services in 1983 and 1985 respectively. All 4 cited cost 
savings as being the prime reason for contracting out While ~Otago and Southland have 
retained contract provision, Auckland reverted to in-house provision in 1988, and in the 
same year Northland terminat~ed its dietary contract, although contract provision for 
housekeeping services was retained. The question then is why the 2 northern boards 
changed their policy and not the southern 2? 
In the first place, it is pertinent to note that these 4 hospital boards are of 
approximately equal size whether considered on the basis of bed numbers or populations 
served. Although the population and bed numbers of the Auckland Board are much 
greater than Otago, compared to other boards in the country these are in the same size 
category in as much as they ~each have over 1,000 beds, offer highly specialized services, 
I . . . . . . . . . . 
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and have medical schools. It cannot therefore be argued that one board might have 
achieved scale economies by contracting out services and not the other. 
Table 2: Principal work stoppages in public hospitals by members of the Hotel and 
Hospital Workers' Union 
Hospital 
Boon1 
Otago 
Otago 
Wellington 
Auckland 
Various Boards 
Wellington 
West Coast 
(Greymouth) 
Northland 
(Whangerei) 
Palmers ton N. 
Ash burton 
Various Boards 
Various Boards 
Various Boards 
Various Boards 
Year 
1974 
1980 
1981 
1983 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Staff 
category 
domestic 
domestic 
domestic 
domestic 
all categories 
orderlies 
domestic and 
orderlies 
dietary 
domestic 
orderlies 
all categories 
all categories 
all categories 
all categories 
( + nursing staff) 
Employer at 
time of work 
stoppage 
contractor 
I 
hospital board 
contractor 
contractor 
State 
(Award breakdown) 
hospital board 
contractor 
contractor 
hospital board 
contractor 
State 
(Award breakdown) 
State 
(Award breakdown) 
State Sector Bill 
State 
(Award breakdown) 
Source: Regional offices of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union 
Duration 
of strike 
1 day 
2days 
4 weeks 
6 weeks 
0 
vanous 
12 days 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
2 ,days 
4days 
• 
variOUS 
2days 
1 day 
1 day 
A similar lack of explanatory significance holds in respect of the relative degree of 
central government financial constraint on these boards. While not readily quantifiable, 
crude level of financial constraint may be taken to be: 
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Government financial allocation 
Hospital board district population 
Table 3: Financial constraints on Auckland, Northland, Otago and Southland hospital 
boards 
Hospital 
boord 
Auckland 
Otago 
Northland 
Southland 
Government fmancial allocation in dollars per capita 
in 4 hospital boards 
1981 1986 
194.2 325.7 
311.5 483.7 
222.9 347.5 
206.6 336.8 
Soufce: Stubbs (1990) p.207. 
From this fo1 n1ula it is possible to dete11uine the financial allocation per capita for 
,each board under consideration, and the data is given in table 3 for the census years 1981 
and 1986. It can be seen from table 3 that Northland and Southland were under very 
similar levels of financial constraint in both 1981 and 1986. Otago, however, was 
considerably less financially constrained than Auckland in both years. If contracting out 
is seen principally as a means of making economic savings, then the change in service 
provision might more readily be expected in Otago than in Auckland. Tighter financial 
constraint in the case of Auckland would be a stimulus to maintain the contract 
• • prOVISIOn. 
There remain, though, substantial differences between the northern and southern 2 
boards in te11ns of political and managerial factors and in industrial relations in the 
ancillary sector. These are discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
Labour force militancy in Au,ckland and Northland: the implications for 
contracting out 
Higher levels of industrial disruption in the ancillary services of the Auckland and 
Northland Boards provide an immediate point of contrast with Otago and Southland. 
Both Auckland and Northland were the scenes of 2 highly protracted work stoppages. At 
the end of 1983, there was a 6 week strik~e of domestic cleaners employed by Crothalls 
Ltd3 at Auckland Hospital. In early 1986, the dietary service workers employ~ed by 
Advanced Food Services Ltd, a subsidiary company of Crothalls, took strike action 
lasting 4 weeks in all the hospitals in the Northland district. This s:trike action was 
preceded by 9 weeks of limited industrial action. 
3 Crothalls Ltd became known as United Health Serv(NZ) in 1989 and the company formed a 
subsidiary of the American based multinational ADT services (American District 
Telegraph). 
I . . . . . 
.. 
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By comparison, the industrial scene in Otago and Southland has been characterized by 
disputes on a much smaller scale both in teuns of duration and numbers of workers 
involved. While limited industrial action by workers under contract employment was 
quite extensive in Otago (Otago Daily Times, 26 June 1984; 3 September 1985), no 
prolonged disruption occurred in either board, and complete stoppages (i.e. strikes) were 
restricted to just a few days at the most. In the Southland Board, strikes were sometimes 
just confined to workers on 1 particular shift rather than all within the entire service. So, 
while there was certainly resistance to the conditions of work under contract employment, 
particularly in Otago, the campaign appears to have been less intense than in Auckland 
and Northland. 
In Auckland, the domestic cleaners' strike began after the contract had been in 
operation for 27 months and staff numbers had been reduced from 182 at the 
commencement of the contract to 105.4 Crolhalls cited a reduction to 102 although no 
independent verification of any of these figures was available. The company justified this 
reduction on the grounds that, "the productivity rate of the .Auckland Cleaners is lower 
than that which exists in our other 46 contracts" .5 but no indication was presented as to 
how the productivity rate was calculated. The considerable time that elapsed between the 
commencement of the contract and the industrial action may largely be attributed to the 
degree of organization and trade union consciousness that had to be established amongst 
the work force. 
The prime reason for the strike was to achieve increases in staffing levels in order to 
combat falling service standards and increased workloads, since attempts to realize this 
through negotiation were seen by the union to have failed. 6 After 6 weeks a government 
appointed industrial conciliator ordered the strikers back to work with the condition that 
Crothalls had to employ an extra 6 workers and replace 1 who had left (SHIFT, April-
May 1984, p.3). The strike, therefore, simply altered, as was intended, the conditions of 
service provision rather than the form of provision, and another 5 years elapsed before the 
contract itself was teuninated. 
The cause of the industrial action in Northland was mainly over the principle behind 
the letting of the contract for the dietary services without there being any prior 
consultation between the workers involved and the Northland Area Health Board. It is 
this factor which largely explains why the focus of trade union attention was on the 
dietary services rather than the housekeeping. The latter had been under contract since 
about the mid 1950s and so, unlike dietary services, there had been no sudden change in 
the fonn of service provision. Rather than specifically seeking an improvement in the 
conditions of employment, the strike was more in anticipation of reduced staffing levels 
and lower standards of service provision under contract. The prime purpose of the strike 
was to have the contract cancelled and a return to service provision by the Board. The 
strike itself had been preceded by a period of limited action from 18 November 1985, the 
date of commencement of the contract, to January 19 1986 (9 weeks) after which there 
was a complete work stoppage to 15 February 1986. 
Shortly prior to the end of the strike, a meeting between the Hotel and Hospital 
Workers' Union, the Federation of Labour and the Employers' Federation proposed that a 
committee of enquiry be fonned to investigate the way in which, "the contract was let, 
the lack of consultation [with the union] and the appropriateness of the contract" (SHIFT, 
April-May 1986, p.ll). On this basis, a High Court injunction was issued ordering a 
return to work. The strike, however, did not succeed in teuninating the contract and 
instead, the fonnation of a committee of enquiry was the immediate outcome. 
These major strikes, however, were only the most visible part of the trade union 
campaign against the contractors in these 2 boards. Apart from these, there were also, in 
4 Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union circular to all affiliates, undated. 
5 Circular letter to all hospital boards from Crothalls, 22 November 1983. 
6 Union circular to all affiliates, undated. 
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the case of Auckland at least, numerous strikes of shorter duration while in Northland 
workers adopted, "a non-cooperation attitude to the contractors"? which meant, for 
example, that workers would collectively refuse to undergo changes in either their hours 
of work, the areas in which they were to work, or the duties required of them. 
Independent consultation with Northland Board management has subsequently confinned 
the extent and effectiveness of much of the non-cooperation campaign. 
The effect of this campaign was that, "no moves could be made by AFS [Crothalls] 
to implement changes which would result in profit making for the company".8 Similarly 
in Auckland, non-cooperation strategies made it very difficult to implement all the cost 
cutting measures deemed necessary by the contractor. For example, Crothalls cite the 
case of night workers being unwilling to transfer to day shift and, "all pressures we have 
applied to move this group have met with union involvement by way of support for their 
members" .9 
The central question then is to ascertain the precise linkage between the industrial 
disruption that took place and the action of the 2 boards in tei aninating the contracts. 
This necessitates examining the roles of the hospital and area health boards' .management 
(appointed) and membership (elected) structures in the context of the trade union 
campaign. In the next section the attitude of hospital managem·ent staff in Auckland and 
Northland is considered and, where appropriate, comparisons are drawn with the Otago and 
Southland boards. 
The management of ancillary services in the Auckland and Northland 
boards 
It might reasonably be expected that the boards' management staff would be highly 
opposed to having placed upon them the employment of such a militant labour force. 
For this very reason, managers would have wanted to continue with contract provision. 
However, from the proposals made by the management to the board members this was 
not the case. According to the available records, in all3 hospitals in the Auckland Board 
wher·e contractors were engaged - Auckland, North Shore and Sutherland, the respective 
hospital managers advocated the teunination of the contracts in their reports to the board 
membership. The justification presented for recommending the termination of the 
contracts was based primarily on the inadequacy of standards of service provision and the 
costs involved with this for.rn of provision. 
Of the 3 contractors who submitted tenders for Auckland Hospital in 1987, 2 were 
thought by management to be insufficiently resourced to ensure an adequate and reliable 
service. The third con'tractor, which was the incumbent Crothalls, was deemed to have 
submitted the most realistic tender and the company cited 3 possible options for the 
board. 'The most economical of these required the elimination of rotating shifts. In an 
internal memorandum of ll November 1987 to the board's chief executive, the executive 
officer, hotel services wrote, "Such changes may cause adv·erse reaction from staff, it 
would affect thirty nine people, possibly creating more industrial action (my emphasis)". 
This point however was not made in the report to the board membership. Instead, the 
management submitted a proposal detailing how the service could be provided more 
economically by the board. This would be achieved by reducing what wer~e thought of as 
the contractor's excessive allowances for, "sick pay, annualleav·e and the miscellaneous 
insurances" .10 
7 Correspondence from Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union to the author, 10 August 1989. 
8 Correspondence from Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union to the author, 10 August 1989. 
9 Letter from Crothalls to Auckland Hospital Board, 6 October 1982. 
10 Management Report to Auckland Hospital Board, 30 November 1987. 
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Despite the formal justification for contract tettnination on financial grounds, the 
possibility of further industrial disruption and consequent suspension of service appears 
an important factor in the recommendation of board (public) provision. For both North 
Shore and Sutherland hospitals, the stated reason in management reports for reverting to 
board provision was based more on poor standards of service than industrial action. North 
Shore management reported that, "The present staff of approximately 23 full time 
equivalent persons is barely adequate to maintain a satisfactory cleaning standard,11 but 
mention was also made that the Hospital Workers Union, "has indicated its willingness 
to cooperate closely with the Board to ensure the maximum possible flexibility, 
effectiveness and efficiency". The clear implication is that the workforce did not 
cooperate closely with the contractor, and this doubtless adversely affected the standard of 
• 
service. 
For the Northland Board, the management argued that, by terminating the dietary 
service contract, cost savings would arise: 
through not having to pay a salary for the Base Hospital food services manager 
($36,500 p.a.), a pay clerk's salary ($20,000 p.a.) and an estimated profit of 
$104,000 p.a., [and] elimination of excess wastage of food would result in 
savings of at least $94,000 per year. 12 
Significantly, however, the Board minutes also made the following observation in 
support of the tet rnination of the contract: 
The Personnel Manager has commented that the Board spends more time 
settling kitchen labour relations issues than it does for any other section of 
Board staff, and in the event of strike action it has been the Board's staff who 
have taken total responsibility for organising volunteers.13 
Even more pertinent, however, to the tennination of the contract, and confirmed fr~om 
discussion with Board management, was the agreement of the trade union to end its non-
cooperation policy. A written communication of 7 October 1988 from the Hotel and 
Hospital Workers' Union to the Northland Board general manager highlights this point 
and is quoted at length in view of its importance: 
The situation should Advance Foods be contracted to continue to run the 
kitchens in Northland will mean that previous agreements made between that 
company and this union would prevail. These agreements thrashed out during 
the period of that dispute are quite clear in guaranteeing the continued privileges 
of all those workers in respect to rosters, the ability to maintain their level of 
earnings and the other conditions they had enjoyed whilst employed by the 
Area Health Board previously. We believe, having discussed with those 
members the current situation, that they have much to offer the Board in the way 
of efficiencies and economies for the future. That level of co-operation would 
be available should the Board decide to take back the ,employment of our 
workers. 
Should, however, the contract go to Advanced Foods or any other 
contractor, clearly that level of co-operation from those members would be very 
difficult to deliver.14 
11 Management Report to Auckland Hospital Board, 16 March 1987. 
12 Management Report to Northland Area Health Board, 3 October 1988. 
13 Management Report to Northland Area Health Board, 3 October 1988. 
14 Written communication from the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union to the Northland 
Board General Manager, 7 October 1988. 
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This passage, and the earlier quotes, make clear that while economic (i.e. cost 
savings) or managerial (i.e. standards of service) arguments could be presented for 
terminating contracts, underpinning both of them was the desire by the boards to end 
industrial disruption and gain workforce cooperation. With the case of Auckland, 
however, a further factor to be considered in the contract tennination was the workforce 
involvement with the elected board me.mbership. Curiously, this involvement went 
much further in Auckland than Northland to say nothing of ~Otago and Southland. 
Politi ~cal factors in th ~e termination of contract services in the Auckland 
Hospital Board 
The composition of the Auckland Hospital Board has been unique through the 
election in 1986 of members of a Community Health Coalition. This was specially 
fot 111ed in, "an eftort to get worker representatives onto the Hospital Boards throughout 
the Northern Region [of the Hotel and Hospital Workers Union]'' (SJIIFT, August-
September 1986, p .. S). The policy was largely born of a view held by many trade 
unionists that existing hospital board members had very little interest either in 
maintaining a comprehensive public health system or in the employment conditions of 
many of its workers, particularly in the face of mounting pressures to expand 
privatization policies in all other areas of the hospital service. 
According to SHIFT (April-May 1986, p.7), the newspaper of the Northern Region 
of the Hotel and Hospital Workers' Union, the main aims of the ~Coalition were., "to 
support a free, public health system and to elect people to the board who are prepared to 
pressure local government to ensure this happens". More specifically, a major concern of 
the Coalition was, "the way staff are treated at the hospital - orderlies, domestics, kitchen 
workers and nurses do not get a good deal". The removal of contractors from the hospital 
system was clearly a principal objective of the industrial campaign. 
Of the 8 people who fanned the Coalition, 4 gained seats on the 14 person board in 
the October 1986 election. The Board itself was structured into 6 committees of which 
the Finance and General Purposes Committee was the one which handled issues related to 
contract service provision and received reports from the board management staff on this 
issue. Six people served on this committee, 2 of whom were from the Community 
Health Coalition and 1 of these was a member of the Hotel and Hospital Workers Union 
employed at Auckland Hospital. All policy decisions had to be approved by this 
committee before being passed by a full meeting of all Board members. The Coalition 
members were not therefore in a majority position on this committee but certainly had a 
platform from which to make their views known and to present arguments for 
termination of the contracts. 
As seen above, the reports from the management recommended, even if not 
particularly persuasively, that board provision be reverted to. It is hardly surprising then 
that the contract was tenninated. Nevertheless it is clear from the arithmetic of the board 
membership alone that the 4 other members of the Finance Committee., none of whom 
had any trade union connection, could have out voted the 2 from the Coalition and 
overturned the management's recommendation had they been so inclined. An argument 
that the changed form of ancillary service provision in Auckland was purely the r~esult of 
the ~election of a special interest group cannot readily be sustained although this was 
undoubtedly an important factor. 
To summarize the situation, 3 factors seem to have operated in conjunction with 
each other in securing the termination of the Auckland Board contracts. First has been 
that of a militant, organized workforce likely to create further service disruption if placed 
under greater pressure from the contractors. The prospect of greater industrial tranquility 
therefore made a return to board provision look more attractive from a .management 
perspective even if difficult to justify financially. The second factor then has been a 
I I . . . . . ' . . . . 
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management structure prepared to undertake further adminiSIIMive 
with a guarantee of workforce cooperation and a less traiiiRildc climate of 
relations. 
The third factor involved, comes from the observation that neither dle ne 
matter how militant, nor the management, no matter how firm ill their poHcy 
have the final say in policy decision making. This duty falls to elected members of die 
Board. To this end, the gaining of political power by workforce representatives has been 
an important factor in bringing about the end of contract service provision. Yet this 
political power has only been founded on the basis of on-going industrial action. None 
of the 3 factors just cited here has operated so forcefully in Otago and Southland where, 
by contrast, the industrial disruption was less protracted although by no means non-
existent There were no worker representatives elected to either of these 2 boards and no 
management proposals advanced for contract tetlnination. 
6. Conclusion 
The case studies of the Auckland and Northland hospital boards have shown that a 
high level of industrial militancy can overturn privatization policies. In general though, 
the extent of ancillary service provision by private contract has remained largely 
unchanged across since the mid 1980s as is evident from the maps in figure 1. Yet the 
foregoing analysis shows that, in some cases at least, industrial militancy has had a 
mediating effect on the development of privatization in different regions. Although more 
empirical research on this factor in other social contexts is certainly required, some fmther 
tentative conclusions can still be drawn. 
Where the industrial action is short lived and sporadic, hospital managers can find 
their interests better served by continuing with private contracting rather than having the 
administrative burden of managing ancillary sector workers. On the other hand, with 
major industrial disruption, managers can no longer wash their hands of the situation and 
must instead consider active involvement in service provision. These observations could 
have considerable bearing on the possible future development of public service provision 
in the 1990s. As this paper has shown, privatization need not be accepted as a fait 
accompli by service user and worker organizations, and can be opposed successfully. 
However, the effectiveness of opposition requires a strong degree of commitment and 
solidarity from the people directly affected. Once established, privatized service provision 
is exceedingly difficult, although clearly not impossible, to remove. From the standpoint 
of state sector managers, it is apparent that, in certain cases, whatever the economic 
merits or otherwise, privatization can present highly intractable managerial problems in 
tet n1s of service disruption and labour relations. 
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